Randomness Assessment in Oscillator Based Elementary TRNG

> Viktor FISCHER, David LUBICZ, Florent BERNARD, Nathalie BOCHARD

CryptArchi 2014 – Annecy (Sevrier), France

July 2014





Randomness Assessment in EO TRNG

Random Numbers in Cryptography

- Random number generators constitute an essential part of (hardware) cryptographic modules
- They generate random numbers that are used as:
 - Cryptographic keys
 - Initialization vectors, nonces, padding values, ...
 - Masks in countermeasures against side channel attacks





Classical versus Modern TRNG Design Approach

- Two main security requirements on RNGs:
 - R1: Good statistical properties of the output bitstream
 - R2: Output unpredictability
- Classical approach:
 - Assess both requirements using statistical tests often impossible
- Modern ways of assessing security:
 - Evaluate statistical parameters using statistical tests
 - Evaluate entropy using entropy estimator (stochastic model)
 - Test online the source of entropy using dedicated statistical tests

Our objectives

Propose jitter measurement method that can be

- Easily embedded in logic devices
- Used for entropy assessment based on existing stochastic model ^a



^aM. Baudet et al., On the Security of Oscillator-Based Random Number Generators, Journal of Cryptology, 2011



DĠA

It is quite easy to design a "TRNG" that will pass the statistical tests ...

...but it is much more difficult to know where the "randomness" comes from and how much true randomness there is... ¹

¹Knowing that only the true randomness cannot be guessed or manipulated

Randomness Assessment in EO TRNG

Outline



- Elementary oscillator-based TRNG
- Principle
- Properties of the clock signals
- Embedded jitter measurement
 - Principle
 - Evaluation of the method by simulations
 - Hardware implementation
 - Evaluation of the jitter measurement in hardware
- Entropy management using stochastic model and jitter measurement
 - Simplified jitter measurement
 - Model-based embedded entropy management
 - Evaluation of the method by attacks



Conclusions



Outline



Elementary oscillator-based TRNG

- Principle
- Properties of the clock signals
- 2 Embedded jitter measurement
 - Principle
 - Evaluation of the method by simulations
 - Hardware implementation
 - Evaluation of the jitter measurement in hardware
- Entropy management using stochastic model and jitter measurement
 - Simplified jitter measurement
 - Model-based embedded entropy management
 - Evaluation of the method by attacks





Elementary oscillator based TRNG

► Principle



where

- $s_i(t) = f(\omega_i(t + \xi_i(t))), i = 1, 2$ are two jittery clock signals,
- ω_1 and ω_2 are their mean frequencies,
- $\xi_1(t)$ and $\xi_2(t)$ represent their absolute phase drifts,
- $\zeta = \omega_1/\omega_2$ is the relative mean frequency.



Assumed properties of the clock signals 1/2

- Osc_1 is a perfectly stable oscillator ($\xi_1 = 0$)
- All the phase drift comes from Osc₂, we want to characterize the phase jitter ξ₂ = ξ
- According to Baudet et al.¹, the random walk component of the phase evolution can be modeled by an ergodic stationary Markov process
 - If the Markov process is Gaussian, it is completely determined by the variance $V(\Delta t)$, where $\Delta t = t t_0$
 - The random walk component is produced by noise sources which affect each transition *independently*, therefore $V(\Delta t) = \sigma_0^2 \Delta t$

¹M. Baudet *et al.*, On the Security of Oscillator-Based Random Number Generators, Journal of Cryptology, 2011



Assumed properties of the clock signals 212

- We consider existence of 1/f^β noises, where 0 < β < 2, as they also contribute to phase jitter</p>
- $1/t^{\beta}$ noises are autocorrelated:
 - They are not taken into account in the stochastic model used for entropy estimation
 - They must not contribute to the size of the measured jitter we wish to measure only the random walk component of the phase evolution
 - We do not consider the impact of the global noise sources on the jitter measurement – this impact is significantly reduced because of the differential EO TRNG principle



Outline

- Elementary oscillator-based TRNG
 - Principle
 - Properties of the clock signals

Embedded jitter measurement

- Principle
- Evaluation of the method by simulations
- Hardware implementation
- Evaluation of the jitter measurement in hardware
- Entropy management using stochastic model and jitter measurement
 - Simplified jitter measurement
 - Model-based embedded entropy management
 - Evaluation of the method by attacks

Conclusions



Principle of the embedded jitter measurement 1/5

- We wish to measure the variance V(∆t) from knowledge of an output bit sequence of an elementary oscillator-based TRNG with K_D = 1
- Relation between the sampling process and function $f_{\alpha}(\cdot)$:



where $x_j \mod T_i$ is the modulo operation on real numbers





DGA

Principle of the embedded jitter measurement 215

Definition of ε-uniformity:

Distribution of samples $\{(jT_2 - \xi(t_j)) \mod T_1\}_{j \in J}$ is ε -uniform, if for all [a, b]:

$$\Big|\frac{\#\{j\in J|(jT_2-\xi(t_j))\mod T_1\in [a,b]\}}{\#J}-\frac{b-a}{T_1}\Big|<\varepsilon.$$

- Number of samples in interval [a, b] inside the translated period T₁, over the number of samples in subset J is ε-close to the size of interval [a, b] over period T₁.
- Recall the right side of the previous figure:



Principle of the embedded jitter measurement 315

Fact 1

For an ε-uniform set of samples, we define

$$\mathbb{P}_{S_{i_0}}\{b_j \neq b_{j+M}\} = \frac{\#\{j \in S_{i_0} | b_j \neq b_{j+M}\}}{\#S_{i_0}}.$$

► If
$$(MT_2 + \xi(t_{i_0}) - \xi(t_{i_0+M})) \mod T_1 \le \min(\alpha T_1, (1-\alpha)T_1)$$
 then
 $\left| \mathbb{P}_{S_{i_0}} \{ b_j \neq b_{j+M} \} - \left(\frac{2(MT_2 + \xi(t_{i_0}) - \xi(t_{i_0+M}))}{T_1} \mod 1 \right) \right| < \varepsilon,$

► If
$$(MT_2 + \xi(t_{i_0}) - \xi(t_{i_0+M})) \mod T_1 \ge \max(\alpha T_1, (1-\alpha)T_1)$$
 then
 $\left| \mathbb{P}_{S_{i_0}} \{ b_j \neq b_{j+M} \} + \left(\frac{2(MT_2 + \xi(t_{i_0}) - \xi(t_{i_0+M}))}{T_1} \mod 1 \right) \right| < \varepsilon,$

otherwise

$$\left|\mathbb{P}_{\mathcal{S}_{i_0}}\left\{b_j\neq b_{j+M}
ight\}-2\min(\alpha,1-lpha)\right|<\epsilon.$$



Principle of the embedded jitter measurement 4/5

Algorithm for computing variance V of the jitter

- ► Input: The output sequence [b₁,..., b_n] of an elementary TRNG with K_D = 1, K, M and N integers ¹,
- **Output**: $V_0 = 4V/T_1^2$ where V is the variance of the jitter accumulated during MT_2 .

Algorithm 1

for $i = 0, \ldots, K$ do

$$S_i \leftarrow [Ni+1,\ldots,Ni+N];$$

$$\mathbf{c}[i] = \mathbb{P}_{S_i}(b_j \neq b_{j+M});$$

end for;

$$V_0 \leftarrow \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=0}^{K} c[i]^2 - \left(\frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=0}^{K} c[i]\right)^2;$$

 $\overrightarrow{}$ return: V_0 ;

DGA

¹In practice, $K \sim 10000$, $N \sim 100$ and M > N, we let $M \sim 200 \div 1600$



Principle of the embedded jitter measurement 515

Algorithm 1 – Recall

for
$$i = 0, ..., K$$
 do
 $S_i \leftarrow [Ni + 1, ..., Ni + N];$
 $c[i] = \mathbb{P}_{S_i}(b_j \neq b_{j+M});$
end for;
 $V_0 \leftarrow \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=0}^{K} c[i]^2 - (\frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=0}^{K} c[i])^2;$

return:
$$V_0$$
;

For all elements from the set S_i compute $c[i] = \frac{\#\{j \in S_{i_0} | b_j \neq b_{j+M}\}}{N}$



Evaluation of the method by simulations

- Objective recover the jitter size that was indeed introduced to generated clocks, independently from the frequency ratio
- Two clock signals generated: $T_1 = 8923$ ps and $T_2 = 8803$ ps
- ► Using the rng.pkg package, Gaussian jitter sequences with $\sigma_c =$ 10 ps, 15 ps, and 20 ps were generated and injected to two clocks
- EO TRNG output bit sequences were used for computing the jitter variance
- Error smaller than 5 % was observed



Injected jitter	Calculated slope	σ_c/T_I	$\sqrt{a}/2$	Error percentage
σ_c	а			
10 ps	9.299909 10 ⁻⁶	0.00156	0.00152	2 %
15 ps	2.03211 10-5	0.00234	0.00225	3 %
20 ps	2.03211 10-5	0.00312	0.00297	5 %



Hardware implementation of the jitter measurement 1/3

- Jitter measurement circuitry implemented in two blocks
- The first block computes K successive values $c_i = Nc[i]$





Hardware implementation of the jitter measurement 2/3

Important remark:

- For some values of *M*, measured values c_i = Nc[i] are incorrect (e. g. for M = 750 and M = 800 in the figure below)
- These values are easy to detect they must not be taken into account in variance computations





Hardware implementation of the jitter measurement 313

- Recall: Jitter measurement circuitry implemented in two blocks
- The second block computes the relative variance 4V/T₁² from K values c[i] according to Algorithm 1



• Summary: Two accumulators, two multipliers, one subtractor, two divisions by shift right





Evaluation of the jitter measurement in hardware

- Implementation results in Altera Cyclone III FPGA device
 - The EO TRNG including jitter measurement circuitry with 32-bit data path occupied:
 - 301 logic cells (LEs),
 - up to 450 memory bits,
 - one DSP block 9x9,
 - four DSP blocks 18x18

▶ Jitter measurement results (250 < *M* < 1200, *N* ~ 120 and *K* = 8192)





From the slope of the measured V₀ for 250 < M < 450:
 Jitter size: σ = 4.8 ps per period T₁ = 7.81 ns.



Outline

- Elementary oscillator-based TRNG
 - Principle
 - Properties of the clock signals
- 2 Embedded jitter measurement
 - Principle
 - Evaluation of the method by simulations
 - Hardware implementation
 - Evaluation of the jitter measurement in hardware

Entropy management using stochastic model and jitter measurement

- Simplified jitter measurement
- Model-based embedded entropy management
- Evaluation of the method by attacks





LABORATOR

Simplified jitter measurement

- Computing the jitter size from the slope is not suitable for hardware implementation
- ► Knowing that the dependence in the selected interval is linear, we can measure just one point of the curve, i. e. just one value $V_0 = 4V/T_1^2$ (e. g. for M = 300)
- The measured standard deviation was $\sigma_0 = 2\sqrt{V}/T_1 = 5.01$ ps

Important remarks

- The variance should not be computed for values *M* (not known in advance), whose mean values *c*[*i*] are close to zero or one
- If the jitter is sufficiently small compared to the T₁ period, these cases are rare



Model-based embedded entropy management

- We can now manage entropy rate at generator output:
 - By entering the known jitter size in the model presented in ¹, we compute the value of frequency divider K_D , to ensure that the entropy per bit is higher than $H_{min} = 0.997$, according to the next expression:

$$K_{D} = \frac{-\ln\left(\frac{\pi}{2}\sqrt{(1 - H_{min})\ln(2)}\right)}{2\pi^{2}\frac{T_{2}}{T_{1}}\frac{\sigma_{c}^{2}}{\tau_{1}^{2}}}$$

- ► For T_1 = 8.9 ns, T_2 = 8.7 ns, σ_c = 5.01 ps and H_{min} = 0.997, we get $K_D \approx 430\,000$
- ► The jitter measurement circuitry can serve for online testing: for the given K_D , the jitter size σ_c shouldn't drop below 4.8 ps, in order to guarantee sufficient entropy rate at TRNG output

¹M. Baudet *et al.*, On the Security of Oscillator-Based Random Number Generators, Journal of Cryptology, 2011



Evaluation of the method by attacks

- Studied attack jitter reduction by decreasing the temperature
 - The temperature was rapidly changed to $-20\,^\circ C$ and left to rise back to $21\,^\circ C$ for several times.



Outline

- Elementary oscillator-based TRNG
 - Principle
 - Properties of the clock signals
- Embedded jitter measurement
 - Principle
 - Evaluation of the method by simulations
 - Hardware implementation
 - Evaluation of the jitter measurement in hardware
- Entropy management using stochastic model and jitter measurement
 - Simplified jitter measurement
 - Model-based embedded entropy management
 - Evaluation of the method by attacks





Conclusions

- We presented an original, simple and precise method of jitter measurement implementable in logic devices
- We demonstrated that in conjunction with a suitable statistical model, the measured jitter can be used to estimate entropy at the output of the generator
- We also showed that the proposed entropy estimator can be used to build a rapid dedicated on-line statistical test that is perfectly adapted to the generator's principle
- This approach complies with AIS31 and ensures a high level of security by rapidly detecting all deviations from correct behavior



Randomness Assessment in Oscillator Based Elementary TRNG

Viktor FISCHER, David LUBICZ, Florent BERNARD, Nathalie BOCHARD

CryptArchi 2014 – Annecy (Sevrier), France

July 2014



