



# **EFFICIENCY OF THE RANDOM DVFS COUNTERMEASURE**


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# OUTLINE

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1. State of the Art
2. Effects of  $F$  and  $V$  changes on the physical leakage
3. Experimental results
4. Enhancing CPA efficiency
5. Conclusion



# SmartCards and Side Channels



# SmartCard : a trend ?

2013

2020 ?



Design Challenges (leakage power, Design for Yield, intra die process variations) ---> DVFS

Adaptive Voltage and Frequency Island


# MOTIVATIONS

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


- Trading performances ( Speed and Power) for security?
- Impact of the voltage changes against Side Channels Attacks ?
- Impact of the frequency changes against Side Channels Attacks ?

# STATE OF THE ART

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- 1999 P. C. Kocher, J. Jaffe, and B. Jun,  
“Differential power analysis”
- 2005 S. Yang, W. Wolf, N. Vijaykrishnan, D. N. Serpanos, and Y. Xie  
“Power attack resistant cryptosystem design: A dynamic voltage and frequency switching approach”
- 2007 K. Baddam, M. Zwolinski  
“Evaluation of Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling as a Differential Power Analysis Countermeasure”

# EFFECT OF CHANGES IN VOLTAGE (RANDOM DVS)



Minor effect  
against CPA

# EFFECT OF CHANGES IN FREQUENCY (RANDOM DFS)

Fig 2a : Leakage model with  $F=33\text{Mhz}$  &  $F=30\text{Mhz}$









Fig 2b : Correlation result



Leakage  
shifted in  
time by  
 $\Delta t$





# EFFECT OF THE RANDOM DVFS





Leakage  
distributed  
in time

# EFFECT OF THE RANDOM DVFS


## Best Case



## Worst case



# EFFECT OF THE RANDOM DVFS



Can't be controlled


# EFFECT OF THE RANDOM DVFS (RDVFS)

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
- Theoretical estimation (Mangard)
  - $S$  = Number of curves necessary to obtain the key with fixed  $V$  and  $F$  values
- Number of curves with Random DVFS (RDVFS)
  - $n$  : Number of couples  $\{V, F\}$
  - $S_n$ : Number of curves necessary to obtain the key with RDVFS
  - $\frac{S_n}{S}$  : Robustness enhancement coefficient
- Theoretical robustness estimation of RDVFS :

$$\frac{S_n}{S} \propto n^2$$


# EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS




# ENHANCING CPA EFFICIENCY -- CLUSTERING



# ENHANCING CPA EFFICIENCY -- RE-SCALING



# ENHANCING CPA EFFICIENCY





# CONCLUSION

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- Random DVFS increases robustness by  $n^2$
- Robustness can easily be reduced to  $n$  by using trace clustering/rescaling
- Possibility of trading performances for security
- Security enhancement is moderated (Linear)

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Thank you for your attention

Questions?