

## From Theory to Practice of Horizontal Attacks on Modular Exponentiation

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
> Crypt-Archi Workshop, Montpellier - La Grande-Motte June 21-24, 2016.












# Introduction

















• Several works for each step in the literature But ...


Difficult in Practice



Saint-Étienne








## Horizontal Attacks in Practice Trace Aquisition

### • Example of Perin et al's Attack

### • Setup

• Sampling Rate: 20GS/s → > 1 billion Samples for an 1024-bits Exponent and Data (Message, Modulo)













## Horizontal Attacks in Practice Trace Aquisition


### • Example of Perin et al's Attack

- Setup
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




# Horizontal Attacks in Practice Curve Cutting



- Example of Perin et al's Attack
  - Use Cross Correlation
    - Define a reference pattern of length t
    - Compute the correlation coefficient values by sliding windows









### Horizontal Attacks in Practice n Criterion (BCDC) [1]: Curve Cutting

• The Bounded Collision Detection Criterion (BCDC) [1]:

$$0 < BCDC(T_1, T_2) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \frac{\sigma_{(T_1 - T_2)}}{\sigma_{(T_1)}} \le 1$$

In the case of collision:

 $BCDC(T_1, T_2) \rightarrow 0$ 

- Solution: Curve Cutting using BCDC instead Cross Correlation
  - Define a reference pattern of length t
  - Compute BCDC values by sliding window

### Conclusion

- Similar Results as cross correlation
- But BCDC allows to define automatically a threshold ([1])












[1] I. Diop et al. *Collision Based Attacks in Practice*. DSD 2015





## Horizontal Attacks in Practice Resynchronization

- Example of Perin et al's Attack
  - FPGA 
    → No resynchronization problems



Patterns after curve cutting

[2] N. Homma et al. High-Resolution Side-Channel Attack Using Phase-Based Waveform Matching. CHES 2006

[3] M. Witteman et al. *Improving Differential Power Analysis* by Elastic Alignment. CT-RSA 2011





Problem in real circuit: Due to the environmental countermeasures the patterns are misaligned despite the curve cutting method...


### **Solution**: Hierarchical Synchronization

- Resynchronization Method
  - Global Alignment: 1.
    - Apply the POC [2] between a pattern reference and other patterns to determine the displacement value
  - Local Alingment: 2.
    - Elastic Alignment [3]






## Horizontal Attacks in Practice Resynchronization-Results




The proposed method seems to work well but... How can we validate this??













## Horizontal Attacks in Practice **Resynchronization-Validation**

### Validation

- Validate the effectivness of the alignment method by using BCDC criterion
  - Do n measurement with the same data (exponent, message, modulo)
  - For each couple of measurements compute the BCDC by sliding windows
  - Compute the average BCDC for each window
  - If all BCDC values are inferior to 0.4 then → The Synchronization is Successful
















## Horizontal Attacks in Practice **Resynchronization-Result Validation**







After curve cutting





**POC & Elastic** 

6000

Times

8000







1.0



1.0

0.8

9.0 Allo

0.2


2000



12000

**BCDC** 

10000



# Horizontal Attacks in Practice Noise and Measurement Quality

#### • Example of Perin et al's Attack

Compression technique to decrease noise in the patterns

- Problem: Compression Suppose the knowledge of the exact number of cycles per bit treatment and so → design knowledge …
- Solution: Estimated SNR [4] (paper CARDIS 2015)
  - Take *n* Patterns  $M_i = [m_{t_1}^i, ..., m_{t_w}^i]$
  - Translate the Patterns in frequency domain using FFT
  - Compute for each couple (i, j) in frequency domain:  $1 \le i < j \le n$ , with  $l \ge 1$

[4] I. Diop et al. *Collision for estimating SCA Measurement Quality and Related Application Attacks in Practice*. CARDIS 2015

$$\widehat{SNR}(t_l, \dots, t_{l+p}) = \frac{1}{BCDC^2(\left[m_{t_l}^i, \dots, m_{t_{l+p}}^i\right], \left[m_{t_l}^j, \dots, m_{t_{l+p}}^j\right])} - 1$$

- Compute the average  $\widehat{SNR}$  values for each time windows  $[t_l, ..., t_{l+p}]$ .
- Translate back the patterns in time domain after canceled the irrelevant frequencies











## Horizontal Attacks in Practice **Noise and Measurement Quality**

#### Setup:

20 patterns, Window lenght p = 200








# Horizontal Attacks in Practice

## Perin et al. Pols research method


- Example of Perin et al's Attack
  - The n operations  $\langle MS \rangle_i$  are represented by a matrix T (k x L) and the k-means is applied over all columns of matrix T



# Horizontal Attacks in Practice

## Perin et al. Pols research method


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


# Horizontal Attacks in Practice

## Perin et al. Pols research method

- Example of Perin et al's Attack
  - The n operations  $\langle MS \rangle_i$  are represented by a matrix T (k x L) and the k-means is applied over all columns of matrix T





## Horizontal Attacks in Practice Distinguisher

Exponent Recovery Using BDCD as Distinguisher

Let:

- P<sub>1</sub>:The pattern corresponding to the MSB operation with only Pols
- $P_i$ : The pattern corresponding to the i<sup>th</sup> bit exponent operation (i  $\neq$  1) with only Pols
- Compute  $\rho_i = BCDC(P_1, P_i)$ 
  - If  $\rho_i$  is higher (or equal) than the collision threshold  $\rightarrow$  secret bit<sub>i</sub>=bit<sub>1</sub>
  - Else bit<sub>i</sub> ≠bit<sub>1</sub>









## Horizontal Attacks in Practice 26 **Distinguisher-Results**

Summarize of Results


Pre-processing Method	Distinguisher	
	Pearson	BCDC
Trace Misaligned	50.8%	50%
Aligned with POC only	53%	52.7%
Hierarchical Alignment	70%	84%
Hierarchical Alignment +Noise Reduction	82%	96%












# Conclusion











## Questions 29

