

Parameter Exploration for Homomorphic Encryption Schemes Analysis.

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I – Introduction

II – PAnTHERS

III – Exploration


IV – Case study

V – Conclusion & future work

I – Introduction

1. Homomorphic Encryption (HE)
2. Related work
3. Main contribution

Introduction – *Homomorphic Encryption (HE)*



Homomorphic Encryption principle


Advantages :

- No decryption in the Cloud.
- Data are secured during the whole process (transfers and computations).

Challenges :


- Active research area
 ⇒ many HE schemes.
- Important complexity and memory consumption.
- Significant expansion factor.

Introduction – *Related work, Taxonomy*



Introduction – *Related work, PAnTHERs*


- **PAnTHERs** = Prototyping and Analysis Tool for Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
- Implemented in **Python**, using **Sage**.



Workflow of PAnTHERs

Introduction – *Main contribution*

- Extend PAnTHERS with an **automated exploration**.
- Allows **designer** to select the **most interesting HE scheme** and input parameter to use.





Workflow of PAnTHERS

II – PAnTHERS


1. Modeling
2. Analysis
3. Calibration
4. Interface

HE basic function




Specific function

distriLWE



mod



Atomic function

Complexity: number of operations performed.

Example:


	MULT	ADD	DIV	MOD	RAND	ROUND
INT	$m \times d$	0	0	0	0	0
POLY	$m \times n$	$m \times n$	0	m	$(n + 1).m$	0

Memory: characteristics of variables created.


Example:

Name	Rows	Cols	Type	Degree
<i>A</i>	n	m	POLY	2048
<i>c</i>	m	1	POLY	2048
<i>b</i>	m	1	POLY	2048


Atomic, Specific or HE basic function



Complexity function




Memory function



link

link



Executable Scheme





Keys: sk, pk, evk
 Plaintext: m
 Ciphertext: c

Execution time (sec)
 Memory_profiler → MiB


Complexity Scheme




Memory cost Scheme



FV execution times



FV complexities estimated by PAnTHERS



$$(2, yTime_2) = (2, yPanthers_2)$$

$$(42, yTime_{42}) = (42, yPanthers_{42})$$


$$\exists a, b \text{ such as } \begin{cases} yTime_2 = a \cdot yPanthers_2 + b \\ yTime_{42} = a \cdot yPanthers_{42} + b \end{cases}$$

Tests on a pedagogic application
which has 10 HE Mult and 6 HE Add.



Table : Results for one parameter variation for 3 HE schemes.

p	2	3
p -calibration time	72 min	111 min
All execution times	2489 min	2489 min
Speedup	34.6	22.4
Mean % of error	5,1 %	4,5 %

PAnTHERS – Recap



Choose analysis	Choose one application	Choose one scheme	Fill parameters variation	Analysis
☒ Complexity ☐ Memory cost	☐ App1 ☒ App2 ☐ App3	☐ FV ☐ YASHE ☒ FNTRU	$\log(q) = 90 \text{ to } 140 \text{ by } 1$ $\log(w) = 2 \text{ to } 40 \text{ by } 1$	Start



Exploration

1. 7 steps of exploration
2. Recap

Exploration – 7 steps of exploration

- 1 ☐ App 1
☒ App 2
☐ App 3
- Select one application of depth d

- 2
- | $\log(q)$ | $\log(w)$ | t | Depth |
|-----------|-----------|-----|-------|
| 100 | 2 | 2 | 10 |
| 102 | 3 | 5 | 9 |
| 214 | 3 | 7 | 14 |
| 110 | 9 | 9 | 12 |
| 190 | 2 | 3 | 14 |
| 325 | 5 | 2 | 14 |
| 200 | 10 | 9 | 8 |
| ... | ... | ... | ... |
- Find every sets of parameters implying a depth of d

- 3
- 
- PAnTHERS
- Analyze the sets with PAnTHERS


- 4
- 
- App
- Execute application with some sets

- 5
- 
- PAnTHERS
- Calibrate the others sets

- 6
- 
- Sort the sets depending on calibration results using Pareto efficiency

- 7
- | Set number | Comp (sec) | Mem (MiB) |
|------------|------------|-----------|
| 1 | 4,5 | 56,2 |
| 3 | 6,2 | 95,8 |
| 2 | 7 | 145,1 |
- Find the most interesting sets

Exploration – Recap



IV – Case study

1. Pedagogic application
2. Expert path
3. Designer path

Case study – *Pedagogic application*

Plaintexts: m_1, m_2, m_3

Encryption:

$$c_1 = \text{Enc}(m_1), c_2 = \text{Enc}(m_2), c_3 = \text{Enc}(m_3)$$

Computations:

$$c = c_1^3 \cdot c_2^2 \cdot c_3^2 \cdot S \cdot T \cdot (S + c_3)(S + c_2 + c_3)$$

with $S = c_1 \cdot T + c_1 + c_2$ and $T = c_1 \cdot c_2 + c_3$



Decryption:

$$m = \text{Dec}(c)$$

Which scheme is the most appropriate for the application ? And which input parameters ?

Case study – *Expert path*

Scheme (Comp)	$\log_2(q)$			w	t
	Min	Max	Step		
FV and YASHE	300	350	1	2^2	2
Scheme (Mem)	$\log_2(w)$			q	t
	Min	Max	Step		
FV	2	44	4	300	2
YASHE	2	22	2	300	2



Most interesting : FV with $q = 2^{300}$, $w = 2^{28}$, $t = 2$

Case study – Designer path

Choose analysis	Choose one application	Choose one scheme	Fill parameters variation	Analysis
☐ Complexity ☐ Memory cost ☒ Exploration	☐ App1 ☒ App2 ☐ App3	☒ FV ☒ YASHE ☒ FNTRU	Every sets of parameters for each scheme	Start

Most interesting : **FV** with $q = 2^{339}$, $w = 2^{68}$, $t = 2$

	Designer's parameters $q = 2^{339}$, $w = 2^{68}$, $t = 2$	Expert's parameters $q = 2^{300}$, $w = 2^{28}$, $t = 2$
Estimation	12,03 sec and 74,65 MiB	12,27 sec and 90,22 MiB
Execution	10,26 sec and 75,80 MiB	10,77 sec and 84,40 MiB

V – Conclusion & future work

- **HE expert** can use PAnTHERS to **analyze HE schemes** and thus applications.
- **Interface** makes easier PAnTHERS usage.
- **Designer path** allows non experts to **select one scheme** and input parameters for one chosen application.

- Actual **application** analysis (e.g. medical).
- **Fast comparison** of available HE scheme implementation using the proposed calibration method.
- Analysis of **hardware** acceleration.

Thanks

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Bretagne



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