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HECTOR TRNG design approach and its demonstration

V. Fischer¹, O. Petura¹, U. Mureddu¹, N. Bochard¹, M. Laban²

¹Hubert Curien Laboratory, University of Lyon, France

²MICRONIC S.A., Bratislava, Slovakia

Outline


- Introduction – random number generators for cryptography
- Standards for random number generator design
- Illustration of a standard design on HECTOR Demonstrator 1
- Demonstration
- Conclusions

Introduction

- ◆ Random number generators (RNGs) constitute essential part of (hardware) cryptographic modules
- ◆ Generated random numbers are used as:
 - Cryptographic keys (high security requirements)
 - Masks in countermeasures against side channel attacks
 - Initialization vectors, nonces, padding values, ...
- ◆ Two main security requirements on RNGs:
 - R1: Good statistical properties of output numbers
 - R2: Unpredictability of output values

Classification of RNGs

- ◆ Deterministic RNG (DRNG) – algorithmic generator started with a seed
- ◆ True random number generator (TRNG) – non-deterministic (truly random)
 - Physical TRNG (PTRNG) – uses some random physical phenomena
 - Non-physical TRNG (NPTRNG) – uses some non-deterministic events (RAM contents, user interaction (mouse, keyboard), hard disk seek time, etc.)



Evaluation of security requirements

R1: Statistical quality - evaluated using **statistical tests**

- ◆ General purpose (black box) statistical tests
 - Standard tests (their speed depends on their precision)
 - ◆ FIPS 140-1
 - ◆ DIEHARD
 - ◆ NIST SP 800-22
- ◆ Dedicated (white box) statistical tests (faster and reliable)

R2: Unpredictability – evaluation depends on the generator class

- ◆ **Physical unpredictability** - evaluated using **entropy estimation**
 - Entropy is estimated using the stochastic model
- ◆ **Computational unpredictability** - evaluated using **cryptoanalysis**
 - Approved cryptographic algorithms are recommended

Outline


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Security standards concerning the TRNG design

- ◆ Unlike other cryptographic primitives, TRNGs cannot have standard architectures
- ◆ Instead, standard design approach is required
- ◆ Currently, two standards are available:
 - **AIS 20/31** of German Federal Office for Information Security (German acronym BSI)
 - **NIST SP 800-90B** of American National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST)
- ◆ The two standards have different design approach, but solutions can be found to fulfill requirements of both of them

European RNG design style

◆ AIS 20/31 design style



- ◆ **Digital noise source** – generates raw random signal
- ◆ **Algorithmic post-processing** – enhances statistical properties of generated numbers (increases entropy rate)
- ◆ **Cryptographic post-processing** – cryptographic algorithm ensuring computational unpredictability when the source of randomness fails
- ◆ **Total failure test** – fast and robust continuous test , no numbers are output if this test fails
- ◆ **Online tests** – preferably dedicated tests, based on the stochastic model
- ◆ **Off-line tests** (Procedure A and Procedure B) – see later


RNG classes according to AIS 20/31

RNG classes

- ◆ Three physical TRNG classes
 - **PTG.1** – Physical RNG with internal tests that detect a total failure of the entropy source and non-tolerable statistical defects of the internal random numbers
 - **PTG.2** – PTG.1 + a stochastic model of the entropy source and statistical tests of the raw random numbers (instead of the internal random numbers)
 - **PTG.3** – PTG.2 + cryptographic post-processing (hybrid PTRNG) – **HECTOR objective**
- ◆ One non-physical RNG class
 - **NTG.1**
- ◆ Four deterministic RNG classes
 - **DRG.1 to DRG.4**

Out of HECTOR scope

Class PTG.3 – the highest AIS 31 security class



Stochastic model

- Must be used to estimate entropy

Dedicated tests & entropy

- Total failure, online and startup test requirements as in PTG.2
- Shannon entropy of internal random numbers > 0,997
- Cryptographic post-proc. must be tested by a KAT

Evaluation procedures


- Depending on availability and quality of the raw binary signal: Method A (preferable) or Method B

- ♦ Highest security – the information-theoretical security combined with the computational security

* Algorithmic post-processing and Online test 2 are optional

American RNG design style

♦ NIST SP 800-90B design style



- ♦ **Digital noise source** – generates raw random signal
- ♦ **Conditioning** – enhances statistical properties of generated numbers (increases entropy rate): by vetted or non-vetted algorithms
- ♦ **Health tests** – fast and robust continuous tests, no numbers are output if these test fail, two tests are recommended (other equivalent or better are allowed):
 - ♦ Repetition count
 - ♦ Adaptive proportion
- ♦ **Off-line tests** – entropy validation on two branches: IID and non-IID

Recommendation of the French DGA-MI (DoD)

- ◆ Recommendations for high-end TRNGs (first draft in progress)
- ◆ Additional requirements on high-security TRNGs comparing to AIS 31
 - Only the source of the digital noise is considered (not the post-processing)
 - Stochastic model of the source of randomness is required (not only of the whole TRNG)
 - All the deterministic parts of the generator must be tested by a KAT (not only the cryptographic post-processing)

Outline


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HECTOR – Hardware Enabled CryptO and Randomness

- ♦ European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 644052
- ♦ 3-year project starting from March 2015
- ♦ 9 partners (3 universities, 3 big companies, 3 SME):
 - Technicon GMBH, Villach, Austria (coordinator)
 - Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium
 - Université Jean Monnet Saint-Etienne, France
 - Thales Communications & Security SAS, Gennevilliers, France
 - STMicroelectronics Rousset SAS, Rousset, France
 - STMicroelectronics SRL, Agrate Brianza, Italy
 - Micronic AS, Bratislava, Slovakia
 - Technische Universitaet Graz, Graz, Austria
 - Brightsight BV, Delft, Netherlands

HECTOR – Hardware Enabled CryptO and Randomness

- ♦ HECTOR core problem
 - Find solutions for the tension between mathematical security, implementation security and efficiency:




HECTOR – Hardware Enabled CryptO and Randomness


- ◆ Main initial objectives in TRNG design
 - Hardware **RNG design approach** based on thorough entropy estimation and management
 - **Stochastic models** of RNGs that can be used to build **efficient and fast dedicated embedded tests**
 - Verify the **robustness** of the proposed TRNGs **against passive and active attacks**
 - Validate AIS31 **certification feasibility** and process simplification by actually going through the full process for a HECTOR TRNG design with an accredited certification lab
- ◆ Additional objective
 - Propose RNG, which is compliant with AIS20/31, NIST SP 800-90B and French high security RNG design recommendations

HECTOR – Demonstrator 1


♦ Functional diagram




- ◆ Three FPGA areas separated by a ground plate
- ◆ Three separated chambers inside a metallic shielding



- ◆ Source of randomness – differential jitter between outputs of two PLLs
- ◆ Fast data interface (LVDS) and serial control interface (SSI)
- ◆ Two modes of operation:
 - User mode – only the raw random binary signal is output
 - Evaluator mode – other internal signals are available
- ◆ Dedicated embedded tests (parametric statistical tests)
 - Total failure test
 - Two online tests




- ◆ Source of randomness – jitter of the clock generated in a ring oscillator
- ◆ Dedicated embedded tests (parametric statistical tests)
 - Total failure test
 - Two online tests
- ◆ Two modes of operation
 - User
 - Evaluator



HECTOR TRNG including embedded tests

HECTOR TRNG contains four essential parts:

- Two sources of the digital noise
- Embedded tests
- Cryptographic post-processing
- Data interface



Embedded tests in HECTOR TRNG

Two total failure tests

- PLL-TRNG: T0a: $P_1 > 0$ (Number of random samples during one T_Q)
- DC-TRNG: T0x: Detects edges of the ring oscillator clock signal

Four online tests

- PLL-TRNG: T1a: $4 < P_1 < K_D/4$ (P_1 computed from 4080 T_Q periods)
T2a: $228 < P_2 < 1280$ (during 4080 T_Q periods)
- DC-TRNG: T1x: $35 < N_{111} < 93$ (number of overlapping templates “111”)
T2x: $185 < C_1 < 326$ (number of XORed couples of bits)

Continuous tests (NIST SP 800-90B)

- T3: Repetition count test with cutoff value $C_R = 51$
- T4: Adaptive proportion test with cutoff value $C_A = 1380$

Known answer test (KAT)

- T5: KAT test of the cryptographic post-processing block

Startup procedure

Generated data have to pass Tests T0 to T5

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Demonstration

Two kinds of access to HECTOR Demonstrator 1

- Physical device + tools
 - Hardware – TRNG cores + tests + control unit
 - Firmware – controls data acquisition and exchange
 - Software – controls access to the demonstrator from the host PC (in TCL)
- Random number generator as a service

<https://trng.technikon.com/>

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Conclusions

- The HECTOR TRNG fulfills **all requirements specified by industrial partners**
- It is **compliant** with the three available documents
 - AIS20/31
 - NIST SP 800-90B
 - Requirements of French DGA

Question:

Can all TRNGs comply with these recommendations? The clear response is: **NO**.

- Possible problems:
 - A mixture of true- and pseudo-randomness in the raw signal
 - Non-deterministic randomness extraction process
 - Stochastic model not depending on measurable parameters

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If you need further information, please contact the coordinator:

TECHNIKON Forschungs- und Planungsgesellschaft mbH

Burgplatz 3a, 9500 Villach, AUSTRIA

Tel: +43 4242 233 55 Fax: +43 4242 233 55 77

E-Mail: coordination@hector-project.eu

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