KU LEUVEN



A Multimode Ring Oscillator based TRNG for FPGAs

Miloš Grujić imec-CO<u>SIC, KU Leuven</u>

June 25th, 2019.



True Random Number Generators (TRNGs)

- Security of crypto applications \rightarrow uniformity and unpredictability of random bits
- TRNGs randomness from physical non-deterministic processes
- Required: stochastic model and lower bound of the (min)-entropy



Goals

Improve the TRNG metric $\frac{Entropy * Throughput}{D.E.* Area}$ by:

- improving the efficiency of the digitization
- boosting the amount of generated randomness in the entropy source

AIS-31 compliant design: security analysis based on the stochastic model

Minimize pseudo-randomness and the effect of the unwanted global noise sources

Multi-mode RO TRNG [YFH+14]



 Missing security evaluation and the entropy "measured" based on the generated random bits without IID claim

Delay-chain TRNG [RYDV15]



General architecture of the DC-TRNG



Entropy extracting process



Experiment 1 – Interlocking of the edges





DC1: 000011111111100000000... DC2: 0000000111111110000000... DC3: 00001111111110000000...





TRNG architecture – Implemented design



Double independent coding lines





New TRNG architecture

- Baseline assumptions:
 - entropy extracted from the jittery pulse of the multi-mode RO
 - presence of independent Gaussian white noise
 - other noise sources present, but not exploited
 - due to differential design decreased influence of global noises
 - raw bits independent due to reset between successive generations

- Notation: w number of stages between edge-inserting stages, n mode of the RO (number of inserted edges), m current cycle (1 cycle contains n consecutive edges), $\frac{\sigma_m^2}{t_m}$ Gaussian jitter strength
- Variance of the *virtual* pulse width coming from the Gaussian noise:

$$\sigma_{pulse,G}^{2} = \frac{\sigma_{m}^{2}}{t_{m}} \cdot d_{stage} \cdot (2 \cdot w \cdot m \cdot n - n - 2 \cdot w \cdot (m \mod 2))$$

• When *w* and *n* are determined by the circuit topology, we can calculate (even) *m*, such that:

$$m \geq \frac{\sigma_{pulse,G}^{2} + \frac{\sigma_{m}^{2}}{t_{m}} \cdot d_{stage} \cdot n}{2 \cdot w \cdot \frac{\sigma_{m}^{2}}{t_{m}} \cdot d_{stage} \cdot n}$$



$$\sigma_{pulse,G} = 10 \ ps$$
 $\sigma_{pulse,G} = 20 \ ps$ $\sigma_{pulse,G} = 40 \ ps$

- Platform parameters:
 - \circ $d_{stage} \approx 675 \, ps$

$$\circ \quad \frac{\sigma_m^2}{t_m} = 2.7 \text{ fs}$$

 \circ $d_{carry,avg} \approx 20 \ ps$ - individually calculated for each delay block

- Design parameters for targeted $H_1 = 0.997$ bits:
 - n = 3, w = 2 circuit topology
 - \circ *m* = 18 => new raw random bit available after 73.57*ns*
 - $\circ \sigma_{pulse,G} = 19.7 \ ps$

Experiment 2

📙 RAW_BIT.bin 🔀

1	000000000000000000011111111111111111111							
2	0000000000000000001111111111111111111							
3	0000000000000000000101111111111111111							
4	000000000000000000000101111111111111111							
5	00000000000000000000111111111111111111							
6	000000000000101111111111111111111111111							
7	000000000000111111111111111111111111111							
8	000000000000011111111111111111111111111							
9	000000000000111111111111111111111111111							
10	000000000000000000001011111111111111111							
11	00000000000000000001011111111111111111							
12	000000000000000000001111111111111111111							
13	00000000000000000000111111111111111111							
14	000000000000000000111111111111111111111							
15	000000000001111111111111111111111111111							
16	000000000000101111111111111111111111111							
17	000000000000111111111111111111111111111							
18	000000000000111111111111111111111111111							
19	000000000001111111111111111111111111111							
20	000000000000000000001111111111111111111							
21	000000000000000000000111111111111111111							
22	000000000000000000011111111111111111111							
23	000000000000000000010111111111111111111							
24	000000000000000000001111111111111111111							
25	000000000000000000001011111111111111111							
26	000000000000111111111111111111111111111							
27	000000000000111111111111111111111111111							
28	000000000000111111111111111111111111111							
29	000000000000111111111111111111111111111							
30	000000000000000000011111111111111111111							
31	00000000000000000000011111111111111111							
32	000000000000000000011111111111111111111							
33	00000000000000000001111111111111111111							
34	000000000000000000000111111111111111111							

Spartan-6 FPGA on LX9 Microboard

Experiment 2



18

Experiment 2 – Influence of the SMPS

The DCDC1 regulator generates 3.3 V. This voltage powers the Flash, Ethernet, PMODs, Vcco_0, Vcco_1, and Vcco_2. Estimated max current for the board circuits is 370 mA, which includes 50 mA for each PMOD.

The TPS65708 has built-in sequencing, resulting in a power-up sequence of 3.3 V \rightarrow 1.8 V \rightarrow 2.8 V \rightarrow 1.2 V.



A note on the arithmetic post-processing

• Applying linear code [16,8,5] as arithmetic post-processing:

 $L(X_1, X_2) = X_1 + (X_1 \ll 1) + (X_1 \ll 2) + (X_1 \ll 4) + X_2$

 $X_1, X_2, L(X_1, X_2) - 8$ -bit words

- In general: LC [*n*, *k*, *d*] post-processing reduces the bias to: $\varepsilon_{LC} = 2^{d-1} \varepsilon_{in}^{d}$
- Linear code [16,8,5] achieves smaller bias for the same throughput as one-stage XOR post-processing:

$$\varepsilon_{LC} = 2^4 \varepsilon_{in}^5 \qquad \varepsilon_{XOR} = 2\varepsilon_{in}^2$$

 Linear code post-processing – reduces both bias and small serial correlation [H. Zhou and J. Bruck, "Linear extractors for extracting randomness from noisy sources", 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory]

KU LEU

Implementation results

- FPGA platform: Xilinx Spartan 6
- Area (without post-processing): 25 LUTs, 80 FFs and 20 carry4 elements
- Throughput before post-processing: 12.5 Mb/s
- Throughput after post-processing: 6.25 Mb/s
- Estimated H₁: 0.997 (raw r.n.)
- **Design effort:** manual placement, no manual routing

00

Pick a random number from 1-10



[source: reddit.com]



Comparisons with [PMB+16]

TRNG type	FPGA	Area [LUT/FF/CARRY4]	Throughput [Mb/s]	Entropy per bit	Entropy throughput [Mb/s]	Design effort
ERO	Spartan 6	46/19	0.0042	0.999	0.004	1 (5/5)
COSO	Spartan 6	18/3	0.54	0.999	0.539	5 (5/1)
MURO	Spartan 6	521/131	2.57	0.999	2.567	1.25 (5/4)
PLL	Spartan 6	34/14	0.44	0.981	0.431	1.67 (5/3)
TERO	Spartan 6	39/12	0.625	0.999	0.624	5 (5/1)
STR	Spartan 6	346/256	154	0.998	153.9	2.5 (5/2)
This TRNG	Spartan 6	25/80/20	18	0.997	17.95	1.67 (5/3)

References

[YFH+14] K. Yang, D. Fick, M. B. Henry, Y. Lee, D. Blaauw, D. Sylvester, "A 23Mb/s 23pJ/b Fully Synthesized True-Random-Number Generator in 28nm and 65nm CMOS," *ISSCC 2014.*

[RYDV15] V. Rožić, B. Yang, W. Dehaene, and I. Verbauwhede, "Highly efficient entropy extraction for true random number generators on FPGAs," *DAC 2015.*

[PMB+16] O. Petura, U. Mureddu, N. Bochard, V. Fischer and L. Bossuet, "A survey of AIS-20/31 compliant TRNG cores suitable for FPGA devices," *FPL 2016.*