

Cryptarchi 2019

Internet of Things security overview

From communication to sensor



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

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Agenda


1. Introduction
2. Communication network security
3. Sensor nodes security
4. Non-volatile opportunities
5. Conclusion

Global market and Scientific production Statistics




Introduction: Security concerns surveys

Concerns about security



Existing security standard




Introduction: A lot of surveys from 2008 to 2015

- 2008 [1]:
 - Computation power and energy limitations
 - No dedicated cryptographic standard
 - Key management and routing tricks to enhance robustness
- 2011 [2]:
 - Propose to combine software and hardware to enhance IoT security
 - No concrete solutions provided
- 2013 [3]:
 - Present risks and challenges
 - Propose a three layers description for IoT (perception, network and application)
- 2015 [4]:
 - Conclusion: proposed solutions are too complex and too expensive to be really integrated in the IoT context.

Introduction: Difficulty to include security in IoT


- Various context to secure with various constraints



Communication protocols for IoT

- 802.15.4 [5]:
 - Basic protocol standard
 - Proposes security with different AES mode of operations
- ZigBee [6]:
 - Add Network and Application security layers using AES
- LoraWan [7]:
 - 2 keys (NwkSkey, AppSkey) used to derive a keystream
 - 2 activation methods (ABP, OTAA)
- MQTT [8]:
 - Proposes security through MQTTS
 - Lack of authentication
 - Lack of user partitionning


Sensor node security




Secure communication possible thanks
to dedicated protocols

BUT

A large vulnerable space still exist





Sensor node security




- A lot of surveys since 2008
- Specific constraints in term of area and energy consumption [9]:
 - 4000 GE for encryption circuit
 - 10µW per encryption

- Implement security inside the main computing unit:
 - Software → Increase execution time (energy consumption)
→ Lead to possible cache attacks [10]
 - Hardware → Increase area and energy consumption [11]
→ Without countermeasure, wide range of possible attacks
(SCA, fault injection, ...)
→ **Screaming channels attack** [12]


Screaming channels attack [12]



Electromagnetic
leakage is
amplified and **sent**
with the packet



Sensor node security



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It is required to protect collected data as close as possible to the sensor


Sensor node security

- To decrease the cost of security in this IoT context:
 - Lightweight cryptography ? (Trivium [13], Present, Klein, ...)
 - Change Computation paradigm ? (Near Sensor processing [14], In memory computing [15])
- A new NIST competition has been launch in 2018 to find the new lightweight standard¹

¹<https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2018/04/nist-issues-first-call-lightweight-cryptography-protect-small-electronics>

Sensor node security



- L-IoT platform¹



- High energy efficiency thanks to wake up possibilities
- 2 cryptographic cores implemented in Hardware

¹ <http://damien.courousse.fr/pdf/DAC2017-LIOT-IPtrack.pdf>

Sensor node security





Energy Consumption	+++	- - -
Area overhead	--	--
Security capability	++	+
Reconfigurability of security features	- - -	- - -

Non-volatile Opportunities





- Emerging and CMOS compatible Non-Volatile memory technologies:
 - New non-volatile logic capabilities
 - Logic in memory
- Opportunity to change the Hardware architecture of computing unit to include Non-Volatile structures:
 - Memory array with computing capabilities
 - Programmable logic gate
- Proposition to create the concept of near-sensor cryptography using non-volatile structure in the pre-processing unit (SECRET project)

Non-volatile Opportunities



15

Logical operations using Fefet transistor



Conclusion

Secure communication protocol fo IoT:

- Various standard protocols (802.15.4, Zigbee, Lora, MQTT)
- Each one proposes security recommandations
- Security depends on the implementation and uses of these protocols

Sensor node security:

- Currently implemented in the communication or main computing unit
 - Lead to high energy consumption
 - Lead to area overhead to achieve good robustness (hardware accelerator)
- The trend is to bring security closer to the sensor
 - Near sensor processing unit
 - New computation paradigm (in Memory for exemple)
 - Wake up capabilities → lead to lower energy consumption



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Thank you for your attention



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